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This paper studies the effects of unions in private-sector nursing homes on a broad range of labor,
firm, and consumer outcomes. We link national data on nursing home characteristics from the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services to records on establishment-level unionization from federal labor
agencies, and employ a regression discontinuity design to identify union effects by contrasting outcomes
in nursing homes where unions closely won representation elections to outcomes in facilities where
unions closely lost such elections. After showing that these two sets of homes are similar leading up
to the election, we estimate union effects on staffing levels, care quality, and other outcomes. We find
negative effects of unions on staffing levels and no decline in care quality, suggesting positive productivity
effects. Consistent with these results, supplementary analysis shows significant increases in wages
for some classes of nursing labor. Some evidence suggests that nursing homes in local product markets
that were less competitive and had lower union density at the time of election experienced stronger
union employment effects. We find no impact of unionization on facility survival. By combining credible
identification of union effects, a comprehensive set of outcomes over time with measures of market-level
characteristics, this study generates some of the best evidence available on many controversial questions
in the economics of unions. Furthermore, it generates evidence from the service sector, which has
grown in importance and where evidence on these questions has been thin.
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Understanding the impact of unionization is a long-standing, controversial, and dicult
question in labor economics. Specically, the literature has long sought to understand the
eect of the unionization of an organization's workers on its wages, employment, output, pro-
ductivity, and survival. A central challenge in estimating the eect of unions is to identify
variation in unionism that is credibly unrelated to rm and employee unobservables. Tradi-
tionally, economists used control functions or individual xed-eects designs to identify the
impact of unions on wages [Mellow, 1981]. Identication of eects on employment, output,
and prots conventionally came from comparisons across rms in dierent kinds of markets,
though the endogeneity of unionization is dicult to address in these designs [Lewis, 1963;
Freeman and Medo, 1984; Hirsch and Addison, 1986; Hirsch, 2004].
Recent work has relied on a more credible source of variation to identify union eects.
DiNardo and Lee [2004] introduced the use of regression discontinuity (RD) design to iden-
tify and estimate union eects. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) rules generate a
discontinuity in the probability of unionization as a function of vote share in union certica-
tion elections. RD analysis exploits this by comparing outcomes among rms where unions
barely won elections to outcomes in rms where unions barely lost. If rms on either side of
the threshold are similar prior to the election, systematic dierences observed in subsequent
years can be credibly understood as eects of unionization.
The current paper applies RD analysis to estimate union eects on a variety of outcomes
focusing on a single industry: nursing homes. Building o data assembled for Holmes [2006],
we linked records from two federal labor agencies | the NLRB and the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service (FMCS) between 1978 and 2002 | to health systems data collected
by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) from 1993 to 2008. CMS's
Online Survey, Certication, and Reporting (OSCAR) system provides establishment-level
data over time on each nursing home in the U.S. that cares for Medicaid- or Medicare-
nanced residents. It includes 96% of all U.S. nursing home establishments. The OSCAR3
data set contains information on facility characteristics and employment by type of worker.
Importantly, OSCAR contains detailed data on quality of care. Unfortunately, the OSCAR
data do not contain wage information, so we supplement our analysis with data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS). Combining analysis on the eect of unions on employ-
ment, output, and quality, this study oers some of the best evidence available on union
productivity eects and some of the only evidence from the service sector. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the rst study of the impact of unionization on product quality in which
quality is reliably measured and unionization eects are plausibly and cleanly identied.
There are a number of advantages to focusing empirical analysis on the nursing home
industry. First, the activities of nursing home workers and technologies of production are
essentially similar across organizations. Thus, we remove an important dimension of orga-
nizational heterogeneity that may confound study of an industry that encompasses more
heterogeneity or of cross-industry analyses.
Second, we get a deep view into rms, permitting greater insight than a study focused on
a few isolated outcomes. Due to the large public role in the nance and regulation of nursing
homes, rich detailed establishment-level outcome data exist across a broad range of labor,
rm and consumer outcomes. Data are available for almost the entire industry nationally
and in a panel across many years. This rich panel also permits powerful falsication tests.
We nd no evidence of discontinuities across the RD threshold in pre-election characteristics
of nursing homes, suggesting that the RD identication strategy is valid in this setting.
Third, unions might be expected to have larger eects on rms and on consumers in
nursing homes than in many other industries, which should throw any productivity eects
into sharp relief. Here, labor is central to the production process. It makes up two-thirds
of nursing home costs [Gertler and Waldman, 1992] and is the key input into the quality of
patient care [Wunderlich et al., 1996]. Furthermore, the need to provide nursing home care
that is proximate to residents' hometowns or families limits the possibility of outsourcing
[Helpman and Krugman, 1987] and reduces the elasticity of consumer and labor demand.4
Our analysis thus focuses on the impact of unionization in a setting with potentially large
eects.
Fourth, recognizing this potential, unions have made nursing homes a strategic organizing
priority for more than 20 years [Sojourner et al., 2011]. This bears on both the internal and
external validity of the current study. Regarding internal validity, a study of nursing homes
oers considerable statistical power compared to what would be obtained in any other single
industry. Several hundred unionization elections are available for the regression discontinuity
analysis, even after applying ltering criteria designed to minimize bias.
Regarding external validity, our ability to measure union impacts on quality and pro-
ductivity in nursing homes contributes new insight into an increasingly important sector of
the economy. Prior research on union productivity eects has focused almost exclusively on
manufacturing, mining or construction. However, health care in particular and the service
sector in general are essential settings for understanding unions going forward. For instance,
unlike in years past, more Americans and more union members now work in health care and
social services than in manufacturing.1
Fifth, the unusually rich data permit exploration of theoretical predictions about which
economic contexts will generate stronger union eects [Hirsch and Addison, 1986; Stewart,
1990; Booth, 1995]. By combining credible identication of union eects with measurement
of market characteristics, this paper oers some of the best available evidence on these is-
sues. For each home experiencing an election, we construct measures of the local market
in which it operates. We examine how union eects vary depending on rms' power in
the local product market. Where economic rents are greater and consumer demand is less
elastic, theory unambiguously predicts larger union eects and this is what we nd. The
empirical evidence available previously has been mixed and plagued by confounding factors.
1According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the number of Americans employed in manufacturing
fell by about 40 percent since 1970, from 18 million to 11 million, while the number in health care and
social assistance grew by 533%, from 3 million to 16 million. In terms of the incidence of unionization, the
number of union members in manufacturing fell 76 percent between 1983 and 2010, from 5.8 to 1.4 million.
Meanwhile, the number of union members in health care and social assistance rose by 133 percent, from 1.2
to 1.6 million over the same period [Hirsch and Macpherson, 2011].5
Further, by constructing the rst national dataset with establishment-level measures of nurs-
ing home unionization status, we can measure union share in each market and test whether
union eects dier in more highly-unionized versus less-unionized markets, something that
has been done before only with weaker designs. We also examine how unionization aects
the employment of workers by skill level and how this interacts with the strength of state
regulation of nurse stang levels.
Sixth, this analysis has signicant policy relevance due to the ongoing policy debates over
health care and labor law reform. Through the Employee Free Choice Act and proposed
administrative rule changes [Greenhouse, 2011], federal labor policy debates have recently
heated up and focused on reforming the process by which the NLRB certies unions to
represent new bargaining units. The eect of this certication is precisely what the regression
discontinuity design measures.
Theory is inconclusive regarding the impact of unionization on many outcomes of in-
terest thus heightening the importance of empirical analysis. For example, the relationship
between unionization and employment levels within a rm are theoretically ambiguous [Pen-
cavel, 1991]. If unions raise the price of labor, rms may purchase less and employment
may fall. This is a central prediction of conventional views of unions and of right-to-manage
models of bargaining over wages. However, if bargaining occurs over both compensation
and employment levels, then unions can bind rms to ecient contracts that raise labor
compensation without reducing employment [McDonald and Solow, 1981]. Also, in monop-
sonistic labor markets, unions may also raise wages without decreasing employment [Link
and Landon, 1975; Manning, 2003]. Theory and empirical evidence, however, suggest that
unions have a negative eect on rm prots [Clark, 1984; Booth, 1995; Lee and Mas, 2009].
The impact of the reduced protability on long-run rm investment, innovation and survival
is still unclear. Freeman and Kleiner [1999] nd evidence that unions extract enough prots
to slow rms' growth but not so much as to threaten rm survival. We can study eects on
growth and survival directly.6
Unions may also aect labor productivity and again theory oers potentially countervail-
ing factors but provides little guidance on the overall direction of eects. Unions advocate
for some changes that, ceteris paribus, reduce productivity, such as rigid job classications
and work rules. However, by helping workers' bargain for public goods and by promot-
ing labor-management cooperation, unions may enhance productivity [Duncan and Staord,
1980; Freeman and Medo, 1984]. These factors aect productivity holding the distribution
of labor and capital xed. Unions can also aect the distribution of labor and capital in ways
that impact productivity indirectly. To the extent that unions raise wages and compensation,
unionized rms have a greater incentive to employ workers who are more productive. Given
higher marginal labor costs, rms will want to employ more productive labor. Therefore,
union rms may have more productive workers due to personnel selection policies [Pettengill,
1979; Reynolds, 1986; Card, 1996; Hirsch and Schumacher, 1998b] and to larger investment
in workers' rm-specic human capital and in liquid capital goods that complement labor
[Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999; Dustmann and Sch onberg, 2009]. We generate evidence that
the overall direction of change is positive and that this is not due to capital-deepening, but
cannot distinguish the other possible underlying mechanisms.
Studies employing RD designs led to somewhat dierent qualitative ndings relative to
the previous literature.2 DiNardo and Lee [2004] study a narrow set of outcomes in the broad
U.S. private-sector economy and wider set of outcomes in manufacturing plants. They nd
that unions have little impact on average wages, employment and productivity as measured
by output per worker. Using an RD design to identify the eect of certication on expected
prots at publicly-traded rms, Lee and Mas [2009] nd a near zero eect at the vote share
threshold, though they do nd substantial negative eects on average using event-study
methods when including rms farther from the threshold. Frandsen [2010] also uses RD to
examine the impact of unions on the distribution of wages and nds that unions compress
the wage distribution without much aecting average wage.
2This may be due to dierence in design or in the estimand, which weighs rms on the margin of
unionization more heavily than the average rm [Lee and Lemieux, 2010].7
Our estimates of the impact of unionization on nurses and nursing homes are meaningfully
dierent from Dinardo and Lee's estimates from the manufacturing sector. We nd that
unionization of a nursing home facility leads to signicant declines in the mean number of
nursing hours per resident day. Specically, unionization is associated with large decreases in
nurse aide (NA) and registered nurse (RN) hours per resident day. These declines in stang
suggest that unionization leads to signicant increases in wages for NA and RNs, which is
conrmed by analysis of the CPS data. In an important and surprising result, the decline
in stang is not associated with changes in care quality. That is, unionization appears to
increase labor productivity measured by both output per nursing hour and quality of care
per nursing hour. There is also no evidence of a signicant impact on establishment size,
occupancy rates, resident case mix, or facility survival.
We also explore whether unions have heterogeneous impacts along three dimensions.
First, we nd larger eects in more concentrated markets, as predicted by theories of rent-
sharing. Second, we nd larger eects in less organized markets, consistent with theories
emphasizing threat eects and union substitution strategies by nonunion management in
more organized markets. Finally, eects vary by the strength of state regulation of high-
skill nurse stang in complex ways consistent with basic theory. In less regulated states,
unionization induces homes to reduce stang levels across all skill levels. In states with
tighter restrictions on the ability of homes to reduce higher-skill stang levels, adjustments
are concentrated on the margin of adjusting levels of less-skilled sta.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
institutional background of unionization and nursing homes and our data. Section 3 describes
our empirical framework, based largely on Lee and Lemieux [2010]. Section 4 focuses on
evidence on the validity of our identication strategy. Section 5 presents our principal
results. Section 6 concludes.8
2 Institutional Setting and Data
Institutional Setting. The nursing home sector is large and growing. In 2009, nursing homes
expenditures were approximately $187B, and the sector employed more than 1.8 million
people. Nursing homes provide long-term, custodial and post-inpatient recuperative and
rehabilitation services for patients who suer from signicant disabilities that require 24-hour
monitoring and care. The combination of an aging population and increasing life expectancy
points to increasing demand for long-term nursing home care over the coming decades. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics forecasts that employment in this sector will grow by 24 percent
over the next decade. There are over 16,000 nursing homes operating in the US with 1.7
million beds which care for 1.4 million patients. The typical nursing home bed is occupied
{ the average occupancy rate is 82 percent. The dominant payer for nursing home patients
is Medicaid with a little over 60 percent share of the patient population. The remaining
40 percent of patients are roughly split between Medicare and private pay/privately insured
patients.3 For-prot, not-for-prot and government owned rms all provide nursing home
care with for-prot rms accounting for the majority (approximately two-thirds) of the
facilities.
Nursing home care is labor intensive and the activities that nursing home employees
perform (e.g. assist patients with bathing, toiletting, feeding, medication management and
moving in and out of bed) are essentially the same across all facilities. Most direct patient
care in nursing homes is provided by certied nursing assistants (NAs) who have limited pro-
fessional training. Nursing homes also employ registered nurses (RNs) and licensed practical
nurses (LPNs). RNs typically have two to four years of education at a college, university, or
hospital. LPNs have nine months to one year of education, typically in a community college.
RNs can provide direct patient care and often oversee LPN and NA sta. These dierent
types of labor are imperfect substitutes for one another. In our data, nursing homes employ,
on average, 2.13 NA, 0.77 LPN and 0.59 RN hours per resident day.
3Medicare covers post-acute care services for 100 days after a qualied inpatient stay at a hospital.9
Unions have long focused on nursing homes as a ripe pool for their organizing eorts. In
1983, Services Employees International Union (SEIU) President John Sweeney initiated a
campaign to organize hundreds of chain-aliated nursing homes. More recently, Andy Stern
(who succeeded Sweeney as SEIU President), vowed to increase organizing eorts directed
towards nursing homes. This \Dignity, Rights and Respect" campaign aimed to organize 100
facilities a year. At approximately the same time, the United Food and Commercial Workers
International (UFCW) began targeting southern nursing facilities. Dozens of other unions
also attempted to organize long-term care facilities during these years. Despite this, unions
have not kept pace with the industry's rapid growth and the unionized share of workers has
declined, though at a slower rate than in many other sectors [Sojourner et al., 2011].
Data Sources. Our principal analysis dataset is the rst national panel on nursing home
characteristics that also includes information on labor relations at each home, including data
on union elections, collective bargaining, and unionization status among each home's em-
ployees. Our sample includes all federally-nanced, privately-owned nursing homes existing
in years between 1991 and 2001. For this population, we have information on labor relations
from the late 1970s to the early 2000s and outcome data for 1993 to 2008. We link infor-
mation from several sources. We began with data used in Holmes [2006] that linked nursing
home records from three sources:
(A) NLRB union certication and decertication elections held between 1976 and 2002
(B) FMCS intent-to-bargain notices led between 1983 and 2003
(C) CMS provider identiers for nursing homes in the On-line Survey, Certication, and
Reporting (OSCAR) system for the years 1991, 1996, or 2001
Using sources (A) and (B), we learn about homes' paths through labor relations processes.
From (A), we observe when union elections occurred, what unions were involved and the
election results. These measures enable the regression discontinuity estimation of the eect
of NLRB certication. This is conceptually somewhat dierent from the eect of a union10
but it is more closely tied to the data-generating process discussed in the next section. Each
relevant NLRB and FMCS record is associated with a home i and at date t. From (B),
we can infer the presence of a union contract. This is useful because many newly-certied
bargaining units fail to reach initial contract agreements and the union may fade before
establishing a toehold within the establishment. We use the FMCS data in a falsication
test and observe that certication really does lead to dierential increases in unionization,
similar to DiNardo and Lee [2004].
Using the matched CMS identiers from (C), we link an additional CMS data source that
provides rich information on nursing home characteristics, the complete OSCAR panel data
of facility characteristics from 1993 to 2008. The OSCAR system provides rich establishment-
level data from all Medicaid- and Medicare-certied nursing home facilities in the United
States (96 percent of all facilities). The OSCAR data include information about nursing
homes' compliance with federal regulatory requirements. Following an initial survey, states
survey each facility about every 12 months on average and no less often than every 15 months.
Following the survey, nursing homes submit facility, resident, and stang information which
are captured in the OSCAR data.
Variables. The share of votes in favor of the union is the forcing variable in the RD anal-
ysis. In constructing this variable, care is required to deal with features of the institutional
process and their statistical implications. First, some elections involve multiple unions run-
ning simultaneously against each other and the no-union option. For any one union to win,
it has to receive support from a majority of voters. Therefore, we use the share of total votes
received by the union with the highest vote share as the raw share. Second, the fact that
the support of the raw vote share depends mechanically on the number of voters can create
problems in the context of regression discontinuity analysis. For instance, only elections with
an even number of voters can achieve exactly a 50 percent share. To deal with these issues,
we follow DiNardo and Lee [2004] in adjusting the raw shares, binning the resulting shares,
and using the mid-point value of an election's bin as the vote share measure.11
We analyze the impact of union certication on a series of employment, care quality, and
other establishment outcomes. Table 1 provides summary statistics. All of these measures
have been used extensively in previous economic analyses of the nursing home industry
[Cawley et al., 2006; Grabowski et al., 2008; Lu, forthcoming]. In terms of employment
outcomes, we examine certied nurse aide hours per resident day (HPRD), licensed practical
nurse HPRD, and registered nurse HPRD. All three of these sta types are reported on the
federal \Nursing Home Compare" report card website.4 Nursing home consumers and their
support persons are encouraged to use this information, along with other quality measures
provided on the web site, to help select a nursing home.
We focus on the three primary measures of care quality. Two are based on results from
the comprehensive mandated government inspections reported in OSCAR: the total number
of deciencies found and an indicator that a severe health deciency was found. The third is
market-based: the percentage of the home's residents who pay for their care with their own
private funds rather than through Medicaid or Medicare. These will be described in greater
detail when results are presented.
We analyze other strategic operating margins that unionization might aect and which
could be potential confounds in understanding union eects on productivity. These include
each home's total number of beds (scale of production and rm growth), percentage of beds
occupied (labor-capital ratio), and acuity of residents' health conditions. Finally, we study
the eect on establishment survival, to see if dierential attrition from the sample could
drive the results.
Patients generally receive nursing home care near their primary residence or the primary
residence of their adult children. This preference implies that markets for nursing home care
are geographically local, and therefore there are hundreds of nursing home markets in the US
with meaningful variation in the structure of the product market. Theory suggests that the
impact of unionization will be largest in less concentrated markets [Abowd and Farber, 1990].
4http://Medicare.gov/nhcompare12
We measure market competitiveness with an Herndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on
nursing homes' shares of total beds in its county. Virtually the whole range of possible HHI
values is observed in the data. Basing HHI on a home-specic, 25-mile radius market does
not change results.
Theory also predicts that the impact of the unionization of a given establishment may
depend upon penetration of unions into the relevant labor market [Booth, 1995; Hirsch and
Addison, 1986], though the relationship is complex and the empirical implications ambigu-
ous. We can explore this empirically as we have variation across markets in nursing home
union density and can estimate unionization eects as a function of geographic market union
penetration. Neither the CMS data nor any other prior national data set distinguishes union
from nonunion nursing homes. So, we construct measures of unionization status for each
nursing home facility at each point in time from the NLRB and FMCS data [Sojourner et al.,
2011]. Union market share is measured as the percentage of beds in the same county that
are in unionized homes.
Over the last several decades most states have instituted some form of nurse stang ratio
regulation with signicant variation across the states in both the timing of implementation
and requirements of the regulations. Most of these regulations specify RN and LPN ratios
with signicant variation across the states in both the amount of RN/LPN supervision and
the direct care stang requirements [Harrington, 2008]. In so far as these regulations are
binding, they may limit the ability of nursing homes to adjust to wage increases by focusing
adjustments on the NA sta. For this reason, we examine the role of these state regulations
in mitigating the impact of unionization.
Additionally, the length of time a union has had to operate in a nursing home may aect
its ability to have eects. Our data allows us to stratify the sample by length of time since
certication in order to explore this possibility.
Sample Selection Criteria. The NLRB and FMCS data cover only private (i.e., non-
government) nursing homes. Thus, we exclude government-owned facilities (about 8 percent13
of total) from the establishment-level analysis. Our resulting sample consists of 22,357 unique
licensed facilities; 14,556 were in operation in 1992, and 15,638 facilities in 2002. In our data,
2,088 facilities had at least one certication election between 1978 and 2001. Of these, 1,375
(66 percent) homes had at least one election where a union won. In the other 713 facilities
with elections, the elections went against the union.
In the regression discontinuity analysis, we focus on NLRB certication elections that
meet the following criteria:
1. At least 20 individuals voted. This minimizes the risk that the exact outcome could be
perfectly controlled by the company, the union, or workers. This would undermine the
quasi-randomization across the vote-share threshold [DiNardo and Lee, 2004; Lee and
Lemieux, 2010].5
2. Occurred after at least one inspection report is observed in our OSCAR data for that
home. The OSCAR data start in 1993. The last NLRB election in our data is from
2002. Therefore, all elections we consider occur in 1993-2002. The requirement of
at least one pre-election OSCAR observation ensures our ability to use pre-election
home characteristics for two important purposes [Lee and Lemieux, 2010]. First, we
can test for pre-election discontinuities in this rich set of baseline observable home
characteristics. If such discontinuities were evident, this would cast doubt on the
validity of the identifying assumptions. As these are the post-election outcomes of
interest, it is very useful to see whether there were discontinuities prior to the election.
Second, we can include baseline pre-election characteristics as explanatory variables
in the analysis of union eects. These are not included to control for selection, but
to reduce the variance unexplained inuences and increase power, as in analysis of
experimental treatment eects.
3. First such election observed in a home. Considering multiple elections for the same
5Bajari et al. [2011] develop an approach appropriate when the forcing variable is a choice variable.14
home raises a number of conceptual issues. Suppose a union got 49 percent of the
vote in a 1996 election and 51 percent in a subsequent 1997 election. For an outcome
measured in 1998, is this two years away from a 49 percent election or one year away
from a 51 percent election or both? To test for discontinuity in baseline characteristics
and for inclusion of baseline characteristics as conditioning variables in estimation it
is unclear which year's OSCAR record to use or what dependencies to allow. Focusing
on only the rst post-OSCAR election in each home sidesteps these thorny issues. We
terms this the home's focal election.
Another issue with multiple elections is the possibility that unions or management
learn enough through recent elections to manipulate outcome of the election in such a
way as to introduce systematic dierences across the threshold in unobservables and,
thereby, to invalidate the identifying assumption. This concern diminishes as the time
between elections extends. We exclude homes that experienced an NLRB election in
the ve years immediately prior to the focal election in our data.
4. In a home without evidence of unionized employees. We do this to clarify interpretation
of the \treatment" as a contrast between homes with no unions certied as bargaining
agent and any union so certied. We exclude elections in homes that had previously
led notice of intent to bargain with the FMCS, which imply the presence of a union.
Because the FMCS records extend back to the late 1970s and we consider elections in
the 1993-2002 period, this gives us at least 15 years of history to examine.6
5. Nursing home that was not publicly owned. Publicly-owned homes have their labor
relations regulated through state agencies. Data from the federal NLRB and FMCS
6We may mistakenly include some long-time union homes in our sample. Homes that: (1) unionized prior
to the start of our NLRB data (late 1970s), (2) whose union and management both consistently failed to
comply with the FMCS requirement to le a notice of intent to bargain at each contract expiry, (3) had
no NLRB election between the start of our NLRB data and the start of the OSCAR data, and (4) had an
NLRB election after its rst OSCAR observation. This does not undermine the validity of the design; it
only moves the treatment a little closer to Dinardo and Lee's denition. Because they analyze all elections
in any rm, the treatment is newly-certifying an agent to represent an additional bargaining unit in a home
that may or may not already contain unionized workers.15
do not cover these homes so we would not have accurate measures of the home's
unionization status. This makes our estimates relevant to private-sector nursing homes,
including both for-prot and not-for-prot, but silent on their eects in public-sector
homes.
Applying criteria 1, 3, 4, and 5 yields a sample of 1,846 elections. Applying criteria 2,
restricting the sample to the end of the period, cuts this to 627 elections. This is the analytic
dataset we use to estimate the parameters.
3 Identication
The empirical model we take to the data is essentially identical to the DiNardo and Lee
[2004] set up, although some dierences in data structure require modest adjustments.
Population and timing. We use an unbalanced establishment-level panel. Nursing home
facilities are indexed by i = 1;2:::I. We focus on facilities that experience a union certication
election on date ~ ti. Home characteristics may be observed on any date in calendar time ~ t.
Variables. For each home-date, we observe L characteristics of the facility denoted Wit 2
RL. For the regression discontinuity analysis, observation dates are measured as the time
elapsed between an observation calendar date and the date of the home's election. The
normalized, elapsed time date of observation is dened as t  ~ t   ~ ti. We examine several
dierent outcomes (e.g. employment, quality of care) which we collectively denote Yit.
The threshold-centered union vote share in the election for home i is given by Xi 2
[ 0:5;0:5]. Union certication is indicated by Di 2 f0;1g.
Model. Adapting from Lee and Lemieux [2010], the empirical model is given by the three
equation system:16
Yit = Di + Wit1 + Uit (1)
Di = 1[Xi > 0] (2)
Xi = Wi02 + Vi (3)
Equation 3 species that the forcing variable, the observed threshold-centered pro-union
vote share (Xi), depends on observed home covariates at the time of the election (Wi0) and
unobserved inuences (Vi). Equation 2 says that, in homes where vote share exceeds the
threshold, a union is certied as the collective bargaining agent of workers. In other homes,
no union is so certied.
Equation 1 denes the outcome vector. It depends on observable characteristics of the
establishment and its market (Wit), which can include lagged values of (Y;W). For post-
election observations (t > 0), Yit may depend on whether or not a union was certied (Di).
In this way,  measures union certication eects. Yit also depends on unobserved inuences
Uit.
Identication of  requires that the mean of unobservable inuences on outcomes Uit does
not shift discontinuously across the threshold. For any t,
limx"0E(UtjW;X = x) = limx#0E(UtjW;X = x) (4)
The validity of this assumption rests on the likelihood that, prior to the election, no
systematic dierence exists between homes where unions just lose the election (x " 0) and
homes where unions just win the election (x # 0). Conditional on having a union election and
on the election outcome being close, which side wins is determined by idiosyncratic factors
| factors that do not inuence later outcomes except through the fact that they aect union
certication. Within a point on either side of the threshold, this assumptions almost surely
holds. However, as a practical matter, obtaining precise estimates requires using information17
from homes with vote shares farther from the threshold, which could introduce bias. For this
reason, we provide evidence on the validity and sensitivity of the identication assumption
in the Results section.
The probability of union certication is thus discontinuous in Xi. Homes with very
small dierences in pre-election characteristics (Wi0;Vi) but with Xi on opposite sides of
the threshold will have dierent post-election experiences. Above the threshold, Di = 1,
implying that a union is certied as the collective bargaining agent for at least a subset of
workers in the home. The union and management then have a legal duty to bargain towards
a rst contract. Below the threshold, no such certication or duty is created. Therefore,
observed post-election dierences in outcomes between homes on either side of the threshold
are interpreted as union (certication) eects.
4 Summary Statistics and Evidence of RD Validity
The top panel of Table 1 presents summary statistics for the distribution of vote shares and
outcomes in focal elections. On average, unions won elections by 2.9 percentage points and
unions won a majority in 55.8 percent of the elections.7 Figure 1 presents the fraction of
elections in each vote share bin for the 627 focal elections. The distribution peaks in the
rst bin above the cut-o.
Test for pre-election discontinuities. The RD design is premised on the assumption that
no systematic dierences exist in the populations of homes across the threshold before the
election. We test this with respect to characteristics observable up to the date of the election.
We focus on homes with elections occurring after at least one OSCAR observation is available
precisely in order to enable this kind of falsication test. In formal terms, we want to test
the joint hypothesis that k = 0 for all k for t  0. To facilitate joint hypothesis testing while
allowing for possible correlation in errors within home across characteristics (dimensions of
7This variable is not raw vote share. It is modied to account for the fact that the support of the raw
vote share variable changes mechanically with the number of votes cast [DiNardo and Lee, 2004]. Further,
the shares are normalized so that a 50 percent vote share has the value 0.18
Y ), we use system (or stacked) OLS [Lee and Lemieux, 2010].8 Each observed Yitk for t  0
is included as an outcome, the 4 parameters for a linear vote share function are interacted
with k indicators so each characteristic is allowed to have a separate vote share function with
4K parameters.
Yit1 = 01 + 11Xi + 1Di + 21XiDi + it1 (5)
Yit2 = 02 + 12Xi + 2Di + 22XiDi + it2
::: = :::
YitK = 0K + 1KXi + KDi + 2KXiDi + itK
We use only observations from homes that have elections with vote shares close to the thresh-
old, where close is dened as within a given bandwidth (h) of the threshold. Discontinuity
estimates for each characteristic (^ k) from this analysis are presented in Table 2. In addition
to the nursing home characteristics from OSCAR that are the focus of our analysis, we also
include two characteristics of the focal NLRB election in order to provide an even stronger
test: the logs of bargaining unit size and number of valid votes cast. Columns correspond to
dierent values of h with the nal row presents the p-value from the joint hypothesis test.
At each bandwidth, the joint hypothesis is not rejected. There is no evidence of systematic
dierences across the threshold in nursing home characteristics prior to the election.9
Certication and unionization. The data speak directly to the eect of NLRB certica-
tion. If certication is the denition of the treatment, then we have a sharp discontinuity
design because there is basically a one-to-one mapping between which side of the threshold
one falls on and whether the NLRB certies a union as bargaining agent for the workers
8When we shift to estimating post-election eects in the next section, we present estimates based on
nonparametric methods. There, joint hypothesis testing is relatively less important and obtaining unbiased
estimates more important. Estimated eects based on parametric functional forms will also be presented in
the appendix.
9Allowing errors to be correlated within home and measure ik across time t rather than within i across
kt gives similar results.19
in the bargaining unit. Subsequent elections and any unobserved prior elections muddy the
waters somewhat, but this interpretation still remains relatively clean. However, certication
is not equivalent to unionization.10
There is evidence that certication raises the probability of unionization. FMCS notices
give reliable measures that a union is present, although absence of such notices is not a
reliable indicator of union absence. In all private rms, the union and company have a
duty to le notices of intent to bargain at least 30 days prior to contract expiry. These
are led only if a union contract is in place.11 In the health care industry uniquely, rms
are also required to le notices of intent to bargain for rst contracts. These notices are
led subsequent to a union election victory but prior to signing an agreement. In some
cases, the parties fail to reach agreement on an initial contract, the union dissipates, and
the rm may remain nonunion. To try to separate these notices and isolate those pertaining
to existing unions only, we study an indicator of having an FMCS notice led more than a
year post-election.
For each home, we consider whether it had any FMCS notice of intent to bargain led
subsequent to the focal election. Figure 2 presents evidence that homes' likelihood of ling
FMCS notices of intent-to-bargain is discontinuous at the threshold. Because non-ling
could be due to either failure to reach rst contract or ling noncompliance, the post-one-
year ling rate is a lower bound on the discontinuity in unionization generated by crossing
the certication threshold. Over 40 percent of homes where unions won the focal election
10Slippage can occur in both directions. On one hand, achieving NLRB certication is no guarantee
that a union will take root at a rm. Though the parties have a duty to bargain, they are not legally
obligated to reach an agreement and in a sizable minority of cases, they do not [Bronfenbrenner, 2003]. In
these cases, support for unionization may wither and the home remain nonunion. This would work against
nding a union eect and is analogous to noncompliance with an assignment to treatment. On the other
hand, especially in recent years, many unions organize outside the NLRB election process. These homes
are not directly relevant to the RD analysis carried out here but are indirectly relevant in two ways. First,
if an FMCS notice is subsequently led in a home that organizes outside the NLRB process, the home
is counted as union for the purpose of measuring the market's union density for nearby homes that later
experience elections. Secondly, if unions form outside the NLRB process in homes where unions previously
lost NLRB elections, this would also diminish the chance of nding a certication eect as it is analogous to
noncompliance with an assignment to control.
11Though it may not always be led when contracts are in place as compliance is not perfect. Further our
data may sometimes miss a match even when led.20
had such lings while less than 20 percent of those where unions lost focal election did,
presumably where unions formed through subsequent campaigns. If FMCS notices led in
the rst post-election year are included, the discontinuity is substantially larger.
The cleanest interpretation of the RD estimate is as the eect of NLRB certication.
Because certication raises the probability of unionization and is unlikely to have eects
through other channels, the sign of the certication eects in these rms should be the same
as the the sign of unionization eects. Our primary results come from signing eects so we
use the terms certication and unionization eects interchangeably. However, the magnitude
of eects of unions taking root in rms may be larger. An alternative interpretation of the
results would be as intent-to-treat eect with noncompliance.12
In sum, our analysis of the data indicates that the RD approach is valid as there is
no systematic discontinuity in nursing home characteristics prior to the certication elec-
tion. Further, the data also indicate that, in fact, union certication strongly increases the
likelihood that union contracts exist in the future.
5 Estimated Eects of Certication
We now turn to estimating the eect of a union winning NLRB certication across a range
of outcomes using the panel of post-election observations. In the post-election sample, the
median elapsed time is 4.7 years, with an average of 5.0 years and a standard deviation of
3.3 years. For each outcome k, we estimate the discontinuity k in the expected value of
characteristic k across the threshold and interpret this as the eect of certication on that
characteristic. For each k, we present estimates from a variety of specications to assess
sensitivity.
Employment and Wages. Table 3 presents estimates of the post-election discontinuity in
each characteristic using local linear regression with optimal bandwidth choice grounded in
12We refrain from fuzzy RD analysis due to concern about measurement error in the union \treatment"
measure.21
asymptotic theory [Imbens and Kalyanaramang, 2009]. This approach is attractive because it
does not rely on an ad hoc choice of bandwidth or assumptions about a particular parametric
relationship between vote share and the expectation of the outcome. In order to allow for
the possibility of errors correlated within home across observations, we estimate standard
errors using a home-clustered bootstrap (M=200).
As described in the upper-left corner of Table 3, the estimated eect of union certication
on nurse's aide stang levels (NA HPRD) is -.311 (0.116). This suggests that, in the years
following elections, homes where unions just win elections have almost a third of an hour
(18.7 minutes) less nurse's aide stang per resident day compared to homes where unions
just lost elections. The mean level of NA stang in the post-election sample is 2.12 HPRD
(Table 1). Therefore, union certication is estimated to reduce NA stang levels by about
15 percent ( 0:311
2:12 ).
As one might do in an experimental setting, we can include additional pre-election con-
ditioning variables to improve precision. Although specication A conditions only on vote
share, specication B conditions also on each home's pre-election mean NA HRPD. Spec-
ication C conditions also on the pre-election means for the full vector of other OSCAR
characteristics. As in an experiment, we would expect point estimates to remain stable and
standard errors to fall. This is largely what we see and provides further evidence of the dis-
continuity design's credibility. The estimate for NA stang is very stable across alternative
conditioning sets. The estimate from specication B is ^  = -.360 (0.118) and from C is -.300
(.118). Stability across specications holds for almost all outcomes and subsamples.
For completeness and robustness, Figure 3 presents an analysis for the NA HPRD out-
come graphically. Homes are grouped into vote share bins of width 5 percent. Only those
with vote shares between 15 percent and 85 percent are included in order to reduce bias
from including homes far from the 50 percent threshold. The pre-election observations
are considered separately from the post-election observations. The former help test for pre-
treatment discontinuity at the threshold, which would arouse suspicion about the identifying22
assumption. The latter helps assess the union certication eect. The conditional mean as
a function of vote share is somewhat noisy, likely due to relatively small sample sizes. The
graph also presents estimates of ^  at the threshold using a parametric conditional mean
assumption. Piecewise quadratic functions of vote share are allowed on either side of the
threshold. Prior to the election, the discontinuity is small and insignicant: -0.049 (0.145).
Looking at observations after the election, the discontinuity is large and signicant: -0.248
(0.102).13
Evidence suggests sizable negative eects of certication on the employment levels for
registered nurses (RN) as well. The preferred specication C produces an estimate of -
0.211 (0.125). Because the average RN HPRD is only 0.503, this is a very large percentage
reduction from certication, on the order of 40 percent fewer RN HPRD in homes where the
union just won the election. Although the eect on LPN hours is estimated to be small and
not signicantly dierent than zero, the signs are consistently negative.
Taken together, these three direct care stang level outcomes suggest that unionization
leads to reduced stang level in nursing homes. This presumably occurs because they raise
wages and compensation costs through collective bargaining. Faced with higher prices, rms
reduce demand. Because the OSCAR does not contain wage data, it is not possible to
develop direct evidence on this price mechanism.
To develop additional evidence on this central question, we draw on the Current Pop-
ulation Survey from 2003-2009 to estimate union wage premia for NA, RN, and LPNs in
the nursing home industry. If the negative union eects on nurse aide and registered nurse
employment are being driven by positive union eects on compensation, we would expect to
estimate a positive union wage premium among such workers. Although the unit of analy-
sis, sample, and research design are all dierent in this exercise compared to the regression
13Analogous graphs for the other outcomes are available in Figures A.1 through A.10 in the Web Appendix
at https://sites.google.com/site/aaronsojourner. Further, estimated eects for each outcome under a range
of assumed parametric functional forms and bandwidths are presented in Tables A.1 through A.11 in the
Web Appendix. Results are generally stable though the graphs show that many of the conditional mean
functions are noisy.23
discontinuity approach, it yields interesting, suggestive evidence.
The estimates are remarkably consistent with the employment eects from the regression
discontinuity analysis. Unionization is associated with sizable and statistically signicant
wage premia for nurse aides 14.8 (1.8) percent and registered nurses 8.5 (4.3) percent. This
is consistent with negative union eects on employment for these occupations, although this
moderate positive RN wage eect alone would not be expected to drive such a large negative
RN employment eect. Further, the lack of a wage premium, estimated at 2.4 (5.3) percent,
for LPNs is also striking. It is consistent with the lack of an LPN employment eect in the
regression discontinuity design.14
Aside from dierential wage eects, federal minimum stang requirements could also be
part of the explanation. Federal law requires all of these homes to have an RN on duty
at least 8 hours every day and to have a licensed nurse (RN or LPN) on duty the rest of
the time. However, federal law has no requirements regarding NAs. Therefore, any nursing
homes employing RNs more than 8 hours per day, when faced with increases in RN wages
might substitute towards LPNs, even if LPN wages also increase.
Productivity. What do these results imply about the eect of unions on productivity?
If productivity is measured as output (resident-days of care provided) per labor hour, then
productivity went up after union certication.15 The inverse of this is built directly into our
stang level measures, which measure sta hours per resident day. Because the eects on all
three types of labor are nonpositive and some are signicantly negative, this suggests that
productivity, as measured by output per hour of labor, increased.
Given that the nursing home literature generally links stang levels to care quality, one
might expect the decline in stang levels to have a deleterious impact on the care quality. If
14Summary statistics by occupation are provided in Table A.12 and more details on the wage premia
estimates in Table A.13 of the Web Appendix. Hirsch and Schumacher [1998a] also found a larger union
wage premium for nurse aides than for RNs or LPNs in their study of health care occupational premia using
the 1973-1994 CPS, though they did not focus exclusively on nursing homes. It also echoes a common nding
of larger premia for lower-skilled occupations [Freeman and Medo, 1984; Blanchower and Bryson, 2004]
and lower-paid workers [Frandsen, 2010].
15Lacking wage data we cannot measure the eect of unions on productivity measured as output per labor
dollar.24
so, it may be that unions reduce quality-adjusted productivity. For this reason, it is essential
to assess the union impact on quality.16
Quality. As Table 3 reports, we nd no evidence of an impact on average care quality,
suggesting that labor productivity increased enough to oset the reduction in stang levels
per resident. We oer evidence from a rich, reliable set of measures of care quality. Under the
direction of CMS, state surveyors use 175 consolidated measures encompassing structural,
procedural, and outcome measures of quality to assign deciencies during the regular inspec-
tion of nursing homes that are reported in the OSCAR data. As is common in the nursing
home literature, we examine both the total number of survey deciencies and an indicator for
the presence of a severe health inspection deciency. Several alternative remedies could be
imposed on facilities that receive a high number of deciencies. These punishments include
civil money penalties, denial of payment for new admissions, state monitoring, temporary
management, immediate termination, and other approaches. Beyond their importance as a
government oversight mechanism in monitoring nursing homes, deciencies have long been
used as an approximation for nursing home quality and are widely thought to depend on
stang levels [Konetzka et al., 2004]. Finally, the federal government has made information
on the number of deciencies assigned to each certied facility nationwide available to con-
sumers on its \Nursing Home Compare" web site. No signicant eects were found on the
total number of deciencies nor on the presence of a severe deciency, and their signs are
opposite suggesting no consistent pattern.
Further, there is no signicant eect on homes' percentage of private-pay residents, those
who are likely more responsive to and demanding of care quality. Although the Medicaid
program is the dominant payer of nursing home services (accounting for about 50 percent of
16An obvious empirical strategy one might consider is to estimate the parameters of a production function
in an RD framework. We decided not to pursue this possibility. In our context, at a minimum, we would
want to specify an empirical quality production technology that allows for a hierarchical organizational struc-
ture [Simon and Barnard, 1976; Williamson, 1967; Rosen, 1992] and an additional, correlated technological
unobservable beyond unobservables that aect union certication [Olley and Pakes, 1996]. To the best of
our knowledge, no one has estimated such a model. Even if estimating such a model were feasible given our
data, it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop and estimate such a model.25
expenditures and roughly 70 percent of bed-days), private-pay residents are associated with
higher prot margins relative to Medicaid residents and are therefore an important signal of
facility resources [Mor et al., 2004]. To the extent that nursing homes compete to attract
these higher margin clients by oering higher quality care, percentage private-pay can be
taken as a market-based proxy for care quality. If unions have negative eects on quality, it
would be expected to show up as a negative eect on percentage private pay.
Other strategic margins. If unionization leads homes to shift to a less severe case mix
and the work becomes easier, then this might be confounded for a productivity increase. To
assess this possibility, we study the eect of union certication on a facility acuity index,
which measures the residents physical functioning level by incorporating both an activities
of daily living index and the proportion of residents requiring special treatments. There is
no evidence of a signicant dierence in residents' average acuity.
We also examine eects on total number of beds (establishment size or scale of produc-
tion) and the percentage of beds occupied (measuring operating eciency), both of which
measure potential adjustments to labor-capital ratios. We observe no signicant eect of
certication on either the total number of beds nor the occupancy rate.17
Digging even deeper, we estimate union eects on seven specic proxies for care quality
that are particularly sensitive to labor quality, that represent potential ways to use (or
misuse) technology to substitute away from high quality stang, or are direct evidence of
lower quality care [Cawley et al., 2006].18 Each has legitimate, medically-appropriate levels,
but union eects on the percentage of residents in any of these seven conditions would suggest
17We also investigated the direct impact of unionization on the number of residents and found no signicant
eect.
18Urethral catheterization can lessen the need for sta to assist with toileting, but place the resident
at greater risk for urinary tract infection, with other long-term complications including bladder and renal
stones, abcesses, and renal failure. Immobility resulting from the use of physical restraints may increase the
risk of pressure ulcers, depression, mental and physical deterioration, and mortality. Feeding tubes can result
in complications including self-extubation, infections, aspiration, unintended misplacement of the tube, and
pain. Overuse and misuse of psychoactive medications may result in mental and physical deterioration.
Although many residents are bedfast or chairbound due to medical conditions, bedfast and chairbound
residents are at a higher risk of developing pressure ulcers and other complications. Pressure ulcers are areas
of the skin and underlying tissues that erode as a result of pressure or friction and/or lack of blood supply.26
that union certication and the decline in stang levels it induces leads to lower quality care.
Results are presented in Table 4. We nd no consistent evidence of changes in care quality.
The only signicant eect suggested higher quality { the percent of residents on psychoactive
medications is about 4 percent lower in homes where unions win elections, o a base of 55
percent.
Market structure and unionization. Turning back to the estimates at the bottom of
Table 3, we see no eect of certication on the competitive structure of the local nursing
market. We do see a positive eect on union density, which follows almost mechanically,
because those homes where unions win elections are categorized as newly union in computing
its market's union density. It is interesting to note the magnitude of the estimate, as it
suggests the average unionizing home holds about 10 percent of the beds in its county's
market.
Finally, we do not nd evidence that certication aects rm survival. This nding is
consistent with prior theoretical and empirical work [Freeman and Kleiner, 1999; DiNardo
and Lee, 2004] and consistent with positive productivity eects. Although unions clearly
have an incentive to extract rents from the rm, they also trade o any rent extraction
against the increased risk that the rm would exit the market. Table 5 presents estimated
certication eects on various measures of establishment survival without conditioning on
anything more than vote share (A) or conditional on the full vector of pre-election home
characteristics (C). The top panel measures the eect on survival to 2005, which 87.2 percent
of the sample achieves.19 We also analyze the eect of certication on surviving at least 5
years post-election or 10 years post election and nd no signicant eects.
19We measure nursing home closure as failure to appear in the OSCAR data for three years, following
Bowblis [2011]. Given that inspections are mandated at least every 15 months, this is a conservative measure.
As our OSCAR panel extends through 2007, we study survival to 2005 as as dened by an indicator measuring
whether each home has any OSCAR observation in calendar years 2005, 2006 or 2007.27
5.1 Eects by market characteristics and time horizon
The impact of unionization may be aected by the antecedents of local labor market union
activity, the competitive environment, the regulatory environment and the amount of time
the union has been active. Below we report the RD estimates by dierences in these market
and nursing home level characteristics.
Union density. Unions' ability to negotiate and enforce terms of employment depends on
their strength in the local labor market, not just on being certied at a particular home. To
assess the relationship between a market's union density and the eect of union certication
there, we stratify the sample based on the home's local market union density at the time of
the election. We divide the sample into those elections that occurred in homes in markets
with below median union density and those in homes with above median union density.
Then, in each subsample, we estimate the eect of certication. Results are in presented in
Table 6. The negative point estimates on RN and NA stang are larger in magnitude in
less unionized markets (top panel) than in more unionized markets (bottom panel).20 The
results on quality look very similar in both types of markets suggesting that productivity
may adjust smoothly.
In more highly unionized markets, unions have more power to support higher compensa-
tion levels. However, part of this ability comes from reducing competitive pressure on union
rms by also raising compensation at nonunion rms in those markets. This occurs directly
through raising market-clearing wages and indirectly through threat eects, which induce
nonunion managers to try to match union standards in order to preempt employees' interest
in unionizing. Therefore, in more unionized markets, there may be less scope for newly
organized unions to raise wages. In this scenario, existing unions in more highly organized
markets raise standards in nonunion rms, meaning their eects potentially pre-date union-
ization and would be under-estimated in the RD design. Although in markets where few
20Bootstrap tests for dierence in the specication A estimates show that only the dierence in RN stang
is signicant (p=0.06).28
employers are organized and wages are low, there may be lots of potential for newly installed
unions to change conditions of employment. This eect suggests the opposite possibility,
bigger direct eects in less organized markets.
Nursing home market competitiveness. Unions' ability to extract economic rents from
rms depend on the existence of rents in the rms. Because rms in less competitive markets
might have more rents, we might expect to see bigger union eects in less competitive (higher
HHI) markets. For NA and RN HPRD, this pattern is apparent by comparing the top and
bottom panels of Table 7. The negative employment eects are negative but statistically
insignicant in competitive markets but larger and highly signicant in less competitive
markets.21 For LPNs, the pattern runs in the other direction. None are signicant.
The evidence suggests that certication leads to lower care quality in less competitive
markets and perhaps higher quality care in more competitive ones. In more competitive mar-
kets, the likelihood of a severe deciency decreases 18.9 (9.6) percent with certication and
the point estimate on total deciency count is negative, also consistent with higher quality of
care. Negative employment eects accompanied by positive quality eects suggest positive
productivity eects in more competitive markets. In contrast, in less competitive markets,
where sta declines are sharper, the evidence suggests negative eects on care quality. Total
deciency counts go up by 2.93 (1.36) and the signs on private pay percentage and severe
deciency results are similarly signed. The eect on productivity in less competitive markets
is ambiguous. Certication has signicantly worse eects on two of the three quality mea-
sures in less competitive markets compared to more competitive markets: total deciency
count (p=0.02) and percentage private-pay (p=0.09). However, none of the dierences in
stang level eects are signicant. This nding strengthens the empirical foundation for an
earlier literature that suggested more positive union productivity eects in more competitive
product markets and more concern about negative productivity eects in less competitive
21Ideally, we would like to look at both HHI and union density simultaneously and in a statistical framework
that allows for formal measurement of dierences. However, given the limited sample size, this does not
produce meaningful results.29
product markets [Hirsch and Addison, 1986].
Another possible interpretation of this result comes from noting that product market
competitiveness is likely highly correlated with labor market competitiveness, suggesting
HHI may proxy for monopsony in the labor market. In that case, this nding could be
interpreted as supportive of a theoretical result in Section 12.5 of Manning [2003] that union
wage mark-ups are likely higher in less competitive labor markets, assuming unions do not
strongly prefer greater employment over higher wages.
Stang regulations. Many states have legislated minimum stang levels that are more
stringent than the national standards. In order to explore the impact of these regulations on
the impact of unionization, we classify state/year pairs as either having \strong" or \weak"
stang regulations based on the work of Harrington [2008] and estimate the impact of union
certication for each sample. Strong regulatory states place oors on RNs and LPNs per
resident and typically do not place as binding limits on the use of NAs. Unionization in the
\strong" states should thus be primarily associated with signicant declines in NAs as the
regulations limit adjustments in RN and LPN sta. The results are presented in Table 8.
Consistent with our priors, certication has a much larger (and statistically signicant)
impact on NAs in strong state-year nursing homes compared to weak state-year nursing
homes. In weak regulatory regimes, the point estimates for NA and RN are all negative but
imprecisely estimated.
Elapsed time. Union eects might grow over time, as the union becomes entrenched
and the contract expands. On the other hand, the union might accelerate changes that
would have occurred anyway. This relationship would produce a large eect early, which
narrows over time [Freeman and Kleiner, 1990]. To investigate this issue, we split the sample
of observations at the median post-election elapsed time (4.6 years) to investigate short-
run versus long-run eects. Table 9 presents short-run estimates using only those OSCAR
observations from years close to the election in the top panel and long-run estimates from
observations in later years in the bottom panel.30
No large dierences exist between the short and long run eects. The negative NA em-
ployment point estimate increases in magnitude and the RN estimate diminishes somewhat.
However, these are not statistically dierent. Looking at the long-run sample, there appears
to be a marginally signicant increase in total deciencies. This diers from the result in
the short-run and overall sample and could be evidence of a decline in care quality over time
driven by greater decreases in RN stang levels. However, neither of the other care quality
measures, the private pay percentage and presence of a severe deciency, conrms this story.
To summarize, certication is associated with decreased employment of NAs and RNs but
not LPNs and there is evidence of corresponding wage increases for NAs and RNs. Although
there are signicant declines in employment, we do not observe an associated change in the
quantity or quality of nursing home care produced, nor do we see evidence that certication
aects capital investment or nursing home survival. The eect of certication is enhanced in
less dense union markets, in more concentrated markets, and when stang regulations are
more stringent.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides important new evidence on the eects of unions on employment, product
quality, and productivity in the increasingly important service sector, where little is known
about union eects. Using a regression discontinuity design, we found that unionization of
nursing homes led to a signicant decline in stang levels. Using the CPS, we found support
for the idea that this decrease in stang corresponded to higher wages in union facilities.
Importantly, the decline in stang level following unionization did not, on average, harm
rm growth or survival, or the quantity or quality of care produced. This suggests that
unionization increased labor productivity. We also observed stronger unionization eects in
facilities in more concentrated markets and the least unionized markets, although the latter
result is also consistent with large but dicult to observe threat eects of unions in highly31
unionized markets.
The exact explanation for increased productivity following unionization remains some-
what open. It is consistent with increases in productivity holding workers xed [Freeman and
Medo, 1984; Perelman, 2011]. Unionized nursing homes may also have a stronger incentive
to invest in workers' human capital and provide additional training. In the context of higher
union wages, the qualications of the workers entering the rms should be higher and the
rate of sta turnover lower. These factors have been found to relate positively to nursing
home care outcomes.
These ndings inform debates over proposals to change federal and state regulations
governing workers' rights to organize unions. A new urry of diverse labor law reform
proposals is being debated all around the U.S. The Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA)
proposed three reforms to make it easier to form and maintain unions: permitting unions to
demonstrate with majority support through signed authorization cards rather than elections,
strengthen monetary penalties for violations of employees' rights to organize, and ending rst
contract impasses through arbitration. In the absence of legislative support for EFCA, the
NLRB has recently taken administrative action to speed NLRB elections and crack down
on alleged violations of employees' right to strike. On the other hand, Wisconsin, Ohio,
and other states are debating reforms that would make it harder for public-sector workers
to unionize. In nursing homes at least, this study nds that expanding certication on
the margin increased nursing home labor productivity, with little eect on rm survival or
product quality.
Looking at the nursing home industry, although interesting in its own right, is important
primarily because it can give insight into the role of unions in broader parts of the economy.
Going forward, unions are likely to survive and expand primarily in nontradeable sectors
where the possibility of outsourcing is minimal and in sectors where organized workers can
most directly use their political inuence to shape the terms of market competition. Nursing
homes exhibit both of these qualities. While the present and future of organized labor is in32
health care, education, public services, retail and other industries of this kind, much of the
literature on union eects has focused elsewhere.33
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7 Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
NLRB election characteristics
Vote share 0.029 0.195 -0.475 0.475 627
1(vote share > 0.50) 0.558 0.497 0 1 627
OSCAR nursing home characteristics
All observations Post-election observations only
NA hours/resident day (HPRD) 2.13 0.763 0 8 7942 2.123 0.718 0 8 5319
RN HPRD 0.558 0.803 0 7.914 7978 0.503 0.736 0 7.914 5332
LPN HPRD 0.773 0.528 0 8 7993 0.778 0.485 0 7.137 5334
Total deciency count 6.826 6.5 0 81 8045 6.87 5.978 0 81 5353
1(severe deciency) 0.233 0.423 0 1 8045 0.265 0.442 0 1 5353
Pct. private pay 22.622 17.641 0 100 8045 21.59 16.196 0 100 5353
Acuity index 10.275 1.576 3 24.083 7971 10.22 1.536 3 24.083 5329
Total beds 125.684 79.377 5 977 8045 124.74 73.111 5 976 5353
Pct. beds occupied 84.837 19.272 0.207 100 8045 85.284 16.942 0.556 100 5353
HHI, in county 0.152 0.195 0.003 1 8045 0.159 0.2 0.003 1 5353
Union density, private only 31.102 26.744 0 100 8045 35.446 27.538 0 100 5353
Turnout 86.571 9.07 45.833 100 8031 86.671 9.138 45.833 100 5344
Log(bargaining unit size) 4.497 0.65 3.091 7.142 8031 4.479 0.616 3.091 7.142 5344
Log(number valid votes) 4.347 0.652 2.996 7.066 8045 4.331 0.619 2.996 7.066 535339
Table 2: System OLS test for discontinuity in nursing homes characteristics in pre-election
panel
Vote share within h of 0.50 threshold
Variables h = 0:05 h =0.15 h =0.25 h =0.35 h =0.50
Stang
NA HPRD -.0584 -.058 -.0987 -.0204 -.137
(0.111) (0.182) (0.122) (0.222) (0.111)
RN HPRD -.113 -.117 -.0307 .0529 -.0723
(0.101) (0.161) (0.106) (0.217) (0.100)
LPN HPRD -.103 -.0872 .00984 .11 -.0321
(0.176) (0.231) (0.173) (0.257) (0.151)
Quality
Total deciency count .349 -.264 .518 1.26 1.09
(0.853) (1.09) (0.89) (0.798) (0.713)
1(severe deciency) -.0584 -.058 -.0987 -.0204 -.137
(0.111) (0.182) (0.122) (0.222) (0.111)
Prct. private pay 2.47 2.72 -.275 .148 -1.78
(3.06) (3.76) (3.00) (2.58) (2.42)
Other strategic margins
Acuity index -.181 -.0348 -.166 -.172 -.388
(0.276) (0.349) (0.259) (0.31) (.23)
Number of beds -8.63 -11 -7.96 2.67 .499
(26.4) (30.2) (22.6) (19) (16.7)
Prct. beds occupied .505 1.46 -2.25 -.671 -.162
(4.7) (5.7) (4.35) (3.7) (3.45)
Market characteristics
Market HHI - same county .0125 .0786 -.00284 .123 .0234
(0.0301) (0.124) (0.043) (0.205) (0.072)
Union density, private only -3.94 -4.86 -3.81 -5.36 -6.71
(3.54) (4.6) (3.78) (3.48) (3.08)
Election characteristics
Log(NLRB election unit size) -.184 -.188 -.156 .0313 -.106
(0.169) (0.235) (0.17) (0.236) (0.142)
Log(Valid votes cast in election) -.207 -.206 -.168 .0122 -.125
(0.167) (0.232) (0.17) (0.239) (0.144)
Number of homes observed 131 350 483 576 626
Number of home-dates observed 587 1,517 2,042 2,480 2,688
Number of home-date-outcomes observed 6,986 18,077 24,350 29,574 32,053
Adjusted R2 .526 .602 .628 .639 .645
Joint-null F-test p-value .844 .885 .968 .697 .359
Coecient (within-home-correlation corrected SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Each column presents discontinuity estimates from a separate system of rst-order linear equations (6).
Only observations from homes with vote share within h of the 0.50 threshold are used.40
Table 3: Estimated eects on nursing homes characteristics using post-election panel and
local linear estimator
Estimates Home-dates obs.
Specication 1 2 3 1 2 3
Stang
NA HPRD -.311 -.360 -.331 5,319 5,250 5,220
(.116) (.118) (.114)
RN HPRD -.278 -.317 -.291 5,332 5,279 5,236
(.208) (.153) (.140)
LPN HPRD -.072 -.050 -.043 5,334 5,302 5,234
(.106) (.068) (.073)
Quality
Total deciency count 1.326 .839 1.609 5,353 5,353 5,245
(.897) (.837) (.870)
1(severe deciency) -.067 -.065 -.048 5,353 5,353 5,245
(.052) (.052) (.044)
Prct. private pay 2.633 -.971 -2.023 5,353 5,353 5,245
(3.908) (2.220) (2.202)
Other strategic margins
Acuity index -.177 -.352 -.188 5,329 5,328 5,221
(.311) (.242) (.230)
Number of beds -24.31 5.151 5.368 5,353 5,353 5,245
(25.81) (4.624) (4.728)
Prct. beds occupied 3.143 2.334 2.081 5,353 5,353 5,245
(4.584) (3.851) (3.724)
Market characteristics
Market HHI - same county .051 -.0004 .003 5,353 5,353 5,245
(.051) (.008) (.010)
Union density, private only 5.545 9.688 10.841 5,353 5,353 5,245
(7.328) (4.904) (3.557)
Specication conditional on home's pre-election mean of:
This outcome variable N Y Y
All other outcome variables N N Y
Coecient (within-home cluster bootstrap SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Each cell presents discontinuity estimate from a separate local linear regression.
Number of home-dates observed varies due to missing outcomes or conditioning values.41
Table 4: Estimated eects on nursing homes characteristics using post-election panel and
local linear estimator
Estimates Home-dates obs.
Specication 1 2 3 1 2 3
Prct. urethral catheter -.817 -.933 -.917 5,353 5,353 5,245
(1.441) (.997) (.956)
Prct. mobility restrained .478 -.526 -1.415 5,353 5,353 5,245
(1.578) (1.577) (1.584)
Prct. spc. feeding tube -.580 -.206 .27 5,353 5,353 5,245
(1.738) (1.043) (1.006)
Prct. psycho-active meds -4.841 -4.667 -3.131 5,353 5,353 5,245
(2.765) (2.47) (2.61)
Prct. skin pressure sores -1.369 -1.673 -.613 5,238 3,484 3,417
(.97) (1.322) (1.121)
Prct. bedfast .123 -.217 .26 5,353 5,353 5,245
(1.052) (.977) (.935)
Prct. mobility chair .237 .07 1.412 5,353 5,353 5,245
(3.568) (3.485) (2.992)
Specication conditional on home's pre-election mean of:
This outcome variable N Y Y
All Table 3 variables N N Y
Coecient (within-home cluster bootstrap SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Each cell presents discontinuity estimate from a separate local linear regression.
Number of home-dates observed varies due to missing outcomes or conditioning values.42
Table 5: Estimated eects on survival
Specication
A C





DV: survival over various post-election spans










Conditional on home's pre-election
mean Table 3 variables N Y
Coecient/(SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Each cell presents discontinuity estimate from a separate local linear
regression. Sample sizes dier between A and C due to missing
conditioning values. Specication B omitted.43
Table 6: Estimated eects by market's union density
Estimates Home-dates obs.
Specication A B C A B C
Home in Less Unionized Nursing Home Markets (below median density) at Election
NA HPRD -.418 -.535 -.533 2,723 2,695 2,686
(0.185) (0.196) (0.219)
RN HPRD -.637 -.610 -.487 2,728 2,706 2,693
(0.331) (0.243) (0.252)
LPN HPRD -.055 -.056 -.051 2,730 2,720 2,692
(0.156) (0.084) (0.106)
Total deciency count .877 1.678 1.974 2,733 2,733 2,695
(1.295) (1.202) (1.401)
1(severe deciency) -.045 -.045 -.033 2,733 2,733 2,695
(0.060) (0.061) (0.065)
Prct. private pay 2.987 -2.029 -4.207 2,733 2,733 2,695
(4.768) (3.019) (3.819)
Acuity index .394 -.134 -.377 2,719 2,719 2,681
(0.491) (0.363) (0.432)
Number of beds -14.887 3.433 6.475 2,733 2,733 2,695
(29.86) (4.536) (5.164)
Prct. beds occupied 4.681 6.560 5.784 2,733 2,733 2,695
(7.638) (4.856) (5.966)
Market HHI - same county .065 -.0003 -.010 2,733 2,733 2,695
(0.092) (0.014) (0.020)
Union density, private only 21.408 20.500 19.564 2,733 2,733 2,695
(8.230) (7.974) (6.004)
Home in More Unionized Nursing Home Markets (above median density) at Election
NA HPRD -.165 -.097 -.111 2,596 2,555 2,534
(0.137) (0.137) (0.202)
RN HPRD .124 .071 -.128 2,604 2,573 2,543
(0.132) (0.155) (0.187)
LPN HPRD -.107 -.128 -.034 2,604 2,582 2,542
(0.125) (0.108) (0.137)
Total deciency count .508 -.069 1.005 2,620 2,620 2,550
(1.203) (1.264) (1.474)
1(severe deciency) -.047 -.038 -.012 2,620 2,620 2,550
(0.065) (0.067) (0 .081)
Prct. private pay 2.098 -.627 -2.154 2,620 2,620 2,550
(4.393) (2.882) (6.170)
Acuity index -.482 -.525 -.128 2,610 2,609 2,540
(0.382) (0.324) (0 .566)
Number of beds -6.139 3.734 4.293 2,620 2,620 2,550
(34.682) (8.154) (02.030)
Prct. beds occupied -5.274 -5.259 -3.595 2,620 2,620 2,550
(4.867) (4.865) (5.516)
Market HHI - same county -.026 .003 .007 2,620 2,620 2,540
(0.041) (0.005) (0.007)
Union density, private only -3.588 .593 2.014 2,620 2,620 2,550
(8.432) (6.394) (8.390)
Specication conditional on home's pre-election mean of:
This outcome variable N Y Y
All other outcome variables N N Y
Coecient (within-home cluster bootstrap SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Each cell presents discontinuity estimate from a separate local linear regression and each column
corresponds to a dierent set of control variables. Number of home-dates observed varies due
to missing outcomes or conditioning values.44
Table 7: Estimated eects by product market competitiveness
Estimates Home-dates obs.
Specication A B C A B C
Home in More Competitive Nursing Home Markets (below median HHI) at Election
NA HPRD -.237 -.230 -.188 2,513 2,478 2,475
(0.170) (0.153) (0.163)
RN HPRD -.217 -.064 -.116 2,518 2,510 2,480
(0.219) (0.167) (0.220)
LPN HPRD -.247 -.160 -.135 2,517 2,503 2,479
(0.122) (0.085) (0.102)
Total deciency count -1.074 -1.464 -.444 2,531 2,531 2,486
(1.208) (1.193) (1.437)
1(severe deciency) -.165 -.187 -.189 2,531 2,531 2,486
(0.077) (0.085) (0.096)
Prct. private pay 9.453 .789 -.327 2,531 2,531 2,486
(5.662) (3.261) (4.265)
Acuity index -.344 -.251 -.190 2,521 2,520 2,476
(0.424) (0.384) (1.036)
Number of beds -23.298 6.419 -2.614 2,531 2,531 2,486
(22.68) (6.073) (8.040)
Prct. beds occupied 7.826 5.718 6.366 2,531 2,531 2,486
(4.843) (4.940) (7.311)
Market HHI - same county .007 -.0004 -.0003 2,531 2,531 2,486
(0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
Union density, private only .355 -1.098 -1.373 2,531 2,531 2,486
(5.509) (3.586) (5.375)
Home in Less Competitive Nursing Home Markets (above median HHI) at Election
NA HPRD -.343 -.416 -.552 2,806 2,772 2,745
(0.156) (0.160) (0.216)
RN HPRD -.344 -.560 -.470 2,814 2,769 2,756
(0.285) (0.270) (0.236)
LPN HPRD .092 .011 .005 2,814 2,799 2,755
(0.147) (0.106) (0.118)
Total deciency count 3.056 2.500 2.927 2,822 2,822 2,759
(1.240) (1.306) (1.363)
1(severe deciency) .036 .038 .018 2,822 2,822 2,759
(0.063) (0.064) (0.065)
Prct. private pay -4.090 -4.100 -3.836 2,822 2,822 2,759
(5.142) (3.469) (3.293)
Acuity index -.264 -.739 -.402 2,808 2,808 2,745
(0.491) (0.378) (0.412)
Number of beds -20.69 1.644 3.534 2,822 2,822 2,759
(33.933) (6.333) (6.156)
Prct. beds occupied -1.883 -.655 -2.013 2,822 2,822 2,759
(6.556) (4.935) (5.232)
Market HHI - same county .044 .003 .002 2,822 2,822 2,759
(0.081) (0.014) (0.019)
Union density, private only 8.990 18.033 16.348 2,822 2,822 2,759
(10.872) (7.887) (7.587)
Specication conditional on home's pre-election mean of:
This outcome variable N Y Y
All other outcome variables N N Y
Coecient (within-home cluster bootstrap SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Each cell presents discontinuity estimate from a separate local linear regression and each column
corresponds to a dierent set of control variables. Number of home-dates observed varies due
to missing outcomes or conditioning values.45
Table 8: Estimated eects by strength of state RN/LPN stang regulation
Estimates Home-dates obs.
Specication A B C A B C
Observations in State-Years with Strong RN/LPN Stang Regulation
NA HPRD -.352 -.405 -.371 3,585 3,545 3,529
(.152) (.151) (.151)
RN HPRD -.032 -.153 -.202 3,595 3,560 3,541
( .254) ( .200) (.192)
LPN HPRD -.089 -.108 -.095 3,595 3,571 3,539
( .113) ( .106) (.104)
Total deciency count .363 .586 1.333 3,605 3,605 3,544
( 1.000) (.991) ( .944)
1(severe deciency) -.068 -.067 -.033 3,605 3,605 3,544
( .054) ( .055) ( .060)
Prct. private pay 5.135 .274 -1.825 3,605 3,605 3,544
( 4.382) (2.846) (2.890)
Acuity index -.266 -.446 -.071 3,593 3,593 3,532
( .393) ( .316) (.317)
Number of beds -23.182 -2.329 -1.274 3,605 3,605 3,544
(25.639) (5.630) (3.924)
Prct. beds occupied 6.824 6.190 6.899 3,605 3,605 3,544
( 6.485) (4.752) ( 4.784)
Market HHI - same county .015 .003 .006 3,605 3,605 3,544
( .043) (.005) ( .007)
Union density, private only 2.971 5.006 6.698 3,605 3,605 3,544
( 7.753) (4.113) (3.984)
Observations in State-Years with Weak RN/LPN Stang Regulation
NA HPRD -.184 -.183 -.255 1,734 1,705 1,691
( .196) (.168) (.268)
RN HPRD -.550 -.414 -.375 1,737 1,719 1,695
(.324) (.199) (.865)
LPN HPRD .051 .045 .053 1,739 1,731 1,695
(.204) (.078) ( .283)
Total deciency count 2.054 .158 .828 1,748 1,748 1,701
(1.584) (1.748) (4.270)
1(severe deciency) .002 .005 -.019 1,748 1,748 1,701
(.079) (.078) ( .232)
Prct. private pay -2.687 -2.194 -3.974 1,748 1,748 1,701
( 5.021) (3.753) (17.703)
Acuity index -.400 -.473 -.498 1,736 1,735 1,689
(.499) (.487) ( .721)
Number of beds 19.657 6.801 3.956 1,748 1,748 1,701
(47.458) (6.706) (10.597)
Prct. beds occupied -7.227 -6.307 -8.562 1,748 1,748 1,701
( 5.241) (5.027) (11.836)
Market HHI - same county .095 -.009 .015 1,748 1,748 1,701
(.102) (.019) ( .105)
Union density, private only 7.996 17.627 18.429 1,748 1,748 1,701
(13.836) (10.088) (13.306)
Specication conditional on home's pre-election mean of:
This outcome variable N Y Y
All other outcome variables N N Y
Coecient (within-home cluster bootstrap SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Each cell presents discontinuity estimate from a separate local linear regression and each column
corresponds to a dierent set of control variables. Number of home-dates observed varies due
to missing outcomes or conditioning values.46
Table 9: Estimated eects by elapsed time since election
Estimates Home-dates obs.
Specication A B C A B C
Short-run eects: observations less than median elapsed time (4.6 years) past election
NA HPRD -.333 -.350 -.337 2,652 2,618 2,600
(0.163) (0.135) (0.134)
RN HPRD -.307 -.282 -.236 2,659 2,632 2,609
(0.258) (0.171) (0.152)
LPN HPRD -.090 -.061 -.042 2,663 2,651 2,610
(0.136) (0.083) (0.075)
Total deciency count .593 -.065 .512 2,676 2,676 2,617
(1.001) (0.876) (0.896)
1(severe deciency) -.078 -.070 -.046 2,676 2,676 2,617
(0.073) (0.074) (0.060)
Prct. private pay -.737 -2.135 -3.341 2,676 2,676 2,617
(3.905) (2.237) (2.200)
Acuity index -.165 -.296 -.044 2,652 2,651 2,593
(0.359) (0.267) (0.241)
Number of beds -18.729 11.296 9.624 2,676 2,676 2,617
(28.978) (4.804) (4.949)
Prct. beds occupied 1.728 1.164 .210 2,676 2,676 2,617
(5.235) (3.687) (3.348)
Market HHI - same county .046 .007 .011 2,676 2,676 2,617
(0.045) (0.008) (0.009)
Union density, private only 8.462 11.058 12.109 2,676 2,676 2,617
(6.441) (4.165) (3.249)
Long-run eects: observations more than median elapsed time (4.6 years) past election
NA HPRD -.270 -.261 -.250 2,667 2,632 2,620
(0.129) (0.128) (0.149)
RN HPRD -.131 -.305 -.318 2,673 2,647 2,627
(0.170) (0.153) (0.129)
LPN HPRD -.029 -.049 -.051 2,671 2,651 2,624
(0.099) (0.080) (0.073)
Total deciency count 1.848 1.593 2.546 2,677 2,677 2,628
(1.103) (1.084) (1.182)
1(severe deciency) -.056 -.056 -.033 2,677 2,677 2,628
(0.053) (0.051) (0.057)
Prct. private pay 1.885 -1.296 -.176 2,677 2,677 2,628
(4.128) (2.759) (2.688)
Acuity index -.178 -.375 -.269 2,677 2,677 2,628
(0.330) (0.302) (0.284)
Number of beds -29.470 -1.161 2.660 2,677 2,677 2,628
(21.108) (6.805) (5.498)
Prct. beds occupied 3.010 2.372 3.411 2,677 2,677 2,628
(5.515) (4.555) (4.423)
Market HHI - same county .053 -.005 -.001 2,677 2,677 2,628
(0.062) (0.011) (0.012)
Union density, private only 2.714 8.053 8.570 2,677 2,677 2,628
(7.974) (6.123) (5.217)
Specication conditional on home's pre-election mean of:
This outcome variable N Y Y
All other outcome variables N N Y
Coecient (within-home cluster bootstrap SE). Signicance: : 10% : 5%   : 1%.
Each cell presents discontinuity estimate from a separate local linear regression and each column
corresponds to a dierent set of control variables. Number of home-dates observed varies due
to missing outcomes or conditioning values.47
8 Figures
Figure 1: Density of election vote shares in main sample (N=627).48
Figure 2: Expectation of indicators for FMCS notice led anytime subsequent to focal NLRB
election and FMCS notice led at least one year after focal NLRB election by vote share.
Means of the indicator variable are presented for each of 20 vote share bins. The discontinuity
from a piece-wise polynomial estimated using all homes is also presented.
Figure 3: Expected nurse's aide hours/resident day (NA HPRD) by vote share bin in the
pre- and post-election periods. The discontinuities from piece-wise second-order polynomial
estimated using all homes is also presented. Only homes with vote shares between 15% and
85% are used.